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We extend the “fraud forensics” research to systematically explain precinct-level and regional variations in 
electoral manipulations in Russia’s March 2012 presidential elections. Parametric last digit frequency tests (a 
multivariate extension of last-digit tests) are employed to analyse fraud heterogeneity during the vote count 
stage. We also utilize author-assembled data harvested from the election monitoring NGO Golos’s regional 
reports of misconduct to explore the co-variance of last-digit fraud with other irregularities going beyond the 
falsification of electoral records. We find that while higher regional education levels positively correlate with 
exposure of electoral malpractice, an educated populace may also incentivise regional officials to channel 
misconduct towards election-day fraud—perhaps because pre-electoral manipulations would be more visible 
to the public than tampering with ballots, and thus, more vulnerable to exposure. Furthermore, last digit fraud 
is associated with (a) fake turnout counts; (b) fake votes disproportionally benefitting Putin; and (c) vote “re-
distribution” whereby votes cast for some candidates are systematically miscounted. We also find that citizen 
reports of election-day misconduct are positively correlated with our region-specific last-digit fraud measures. 
The results indicate that reports by independent observers of sub-national electoral irregularities could be 
employed as reasonably reliable indicators of fraud and that could be utilized alongside other data to ascertain 
the incidence of misconduct in Russia and other settings. 
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1. Introduction1  
In the winter months of 2011-2012, tens of thousands of citizens across Russia took to the streets to engage in 
anti-regime protests. One of their central concerns had been electoral fraud allegedly perpetrated in the 
December elections to the State Duma (Smyth, Sobolev et al. 2013). By many accounts, the extent of the 
mass uprising took the Putin-Medvedev tandem by surprise. Consequently, every effort was made to indicate 
to the electorate that the March 2012 presidential elections that followed the State Duma race would not be 
tainted with fraud. The regime’s protestations notwithstanding, Golos, Russia’s highly respected election 
monitoring NGO, as indeed many other observers, reported substantial violations of electoral integrity  
(Gel'man 2013; Kynev, Vahshtain et al. 2012). As with Russia’s previous elections, pronounced regional 
heterogeneity had been apparent in the prevalence of misconduct.   
  In this paper, we extend the rich “fraud forensics” research that relies on statistical procedures to 
detect fraud, to systematically explain both precinct-level and regional variations in electoral manipulations 
in the March 2012 presidential elections. One such “forensic” procedure is the last-digit test which allows us 
to ascertain, based on the prevalence of specific numbers on precinct aggregate vote records—notably 
lastdigit zeroes—whether votes had been systematically falsified. The assumption behind this analysis is that 
any systematic heterogeneity in last digits of numbers entered on electoral precinct return sheets, such as 
systematic deviation in last-digit frequencies from a uniform benchmark, is inconsistent with clean elections 
and signals shortcomings in electoral integrity (Beber and Scacco 2012; Mebane and Kalinin 2009; 
Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2009). We contribute to the literature on fraud heterogeneity by using last-digit 
frequency regression analysis (a multivariate extension of last-digit tests) to capture potential regional co- 
                                                 
1 We are grateful to the Editor and reviewers for very helpful suggestions for improving the paper and 
analysis. We also thank Alexander Libman for kindly sharing regional socio-economic data for select 
variables. Michael Wahman and Carolien van Ham provided useful comments on earlier drafts of this paper.  
Any errors are of course solely those of the authors.   
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variates of fraud—notably, those related to regional ethnic composition; education; geographical distance 
from Moscow; and fiscal dependence on the federal centre. We find in particular that education encourages 
exposure of electoral malpractice, yet we also observe that higher regional education levels may incentivise 
regional officials to channel misconduct towards election-day fraud—perhaps because pre-electoral 
manipulations would be more visible to the public than tampering with ballots, and thus, more vulnerable to 
exposure. To our knowledge, earlier research has not featured the last-digit fraud measure to capture such 
potential regional co-variates of fraud or of fraud substitution. In concurrent analysis, most recently, Rundlett 
and Svolik (2016) have pointed to an alternative mechanism of election-day fraud—the rounding of vote 
shares for the winner Putin to a higher multiple of five. Evidence suggests that the rounding of vote shares 
appeared to be more widespread in precincts with higher vote for Putin. Unlike the analysis presented in our 
paper, Rundlett and Svolik (2016) do not investigate regional correlates of fraud that could make fraud more 
or less likely, nor do they investigate whether instances of election-day fraud are concentrated in a few 
individual regions or, alternatively, if fraud has “metastasised” (Lukinova et al., 2011) across the country. 
Our paper therefore nuances our understanding of why fraud is more likely in some regions and not in others 
while also contributing to the growing literature on electoral malpractice in other settings. Employing 
electoral data for over 95,000 precincts, we identify the presence of at least three operationally-distinct 
lastdigit fraud types: (a) fake turnout counts; (b) fake votes that disproportionally benefitted the winning 
candidate, in our case Vladimir Putin; and (c) vote “re-distribution” where votes cast for some candidates— 
notably the pro-Kremlin contender Sergey Mironov—had been systematically miscounted.  
The last-digit measure however does not allow us to test whether other types of irregularities had been  
occurring in particular regions, perhaps substituting for election-day last-digit type fraud (or vice versa). 
Manipulations going beyond the crude writing in of made-up numbers on election return sheets, which may 
be detected by applying the last-digit tests, are however notoriously difficult to capture in statistical analysis.   
Fortunately, we possess additional data that we leverage for these purposes. On the eve of the elections, 
Golos set up a hotline encouraging citizens to report misconduct occurring both prior to elections and on 
election-day.  These reports were then aggregated to create a geographical map of electoral violations.  We 
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utilize author-assembled data that we harvested from these Golos records to explore the co-variance of 
lastdigit fraud with other irregularities going beyond the falsification of electoral records. To this end, we 
propose a simple deviance-based measure of region-specific last-digit fraud that can be used as an 
explanatory variable in regression analyses of fraud reports. We are not aware of other researchers utilizing  
Golos-type data in this way to augment “forensic” data on fraud in Russian elections. We find that citizen 
reporting of election-day misconduct co-varies with last-digit fraud. These findings have important 
comparative, theoretical and policy implications. In vast countries like Russia, Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, or  
India, the logistics of securing monitors for each and every polling station may present significant challenges. 
As Ichino and Sheundeln (2012) find, spreading the monitors thinly—and sending them to only select polling 
stations—might only encourage fraud displacement to localities were monitors are not present.  Our analysis 
does not allow us to establish whether citizen vigilance in fact serves to dis-incentivise electoral malpractice.  
Nevertheless, our paper suggests that local eyewitness accounts of misconduct filed by ordinary citizens can 
be quite accurate in establishing broader territorial patterns of irregularities and could be utilized alongside 
other data to ascertain the incidence of misconduct in Russia and other settings.  
Our paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we outline our analytical framework and generate  
hypotheses. In Sections 3-5, we discuss our measures and data and perform statistical analysis. Section 6 
concludes with some reflections on the wider implications of our findings for understanding political regime 
dynamics in Russia and for comparative theorizing on electoral misconduct.  
  
2. Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses    
  
Our analysis builds on the growing body of “fraud forensics” scholarship, which develops statistical 
procedures for analysing fraud and specifically for spotting the “fingerprints” of fraud (Argersinger 1985; 
Beber and Scacco 2012; Deckert and Myagkov 2010; Deckert, Myagkov et al. 2011; Lukinova, Myagkov et 
al. 2011; Mebane 2004, 2010, 2011; Mebane and Kalinin 2009; Myagkov, Ordeshook et al. 2005; Myagkov, 
5  
  
Ordeshook et al. 2009). Since irregularities can take many different forms,2 the statistical methodology 
employed by these studies varies, and is often conditional upon prior assumptions that researchers choose to  
adopt with respect to the distribution of results in hypothetical “clean” elections. For instance, Mebane  
(2010) applies multinomial regression analysis to vote counts—that is, vote counts reported by electoral 
officials— from Iran’s 2009 presidential elections and uses the results of the earlier 2005 presidential 
elections to calibrate the baseline outcomes and to flag individual unexpected—and potentially fraudulent— 
outcomes. Mebane (2010) also employs the analysis that is based on second-digit Benford’s Law—a 
prediction as to the observed frequency of numbers in the second digits of official vote counts—that suggests 
that reported vote counts often deviate from their baseline expected outcomes. One shortcoming of the above 
vote count regressions as fraud tests, as Mebane readily admits, lies in their sensitivity to cases of strategic 
voting which can be mistaken for vote count fraud. Vote count regressions work well only if we are prepared 
to assume that the effect of political processes on voter preferences in the interim years could not in itself 
produce significant heterogeneity in electoral results. Similarly, the robustness of the second-digit Benford’s 
Law as a forensic tool when applied to election outcomes has been contested and is hotly debated (Deckert, 
Myagkov et al. 2011; Mebane 2011; Medzihorsky 2015). In another application of regression analysis that 
uses Russian precinct-level data, Myagkov, Ordeshook and Shakin (2009) and Lukinova, Myagkov and 
Ordeshook (2011) run region-by-region univariate regressions that help identify regions where, as turnout 
increases, the opposition party or candidate loses votes in absolute terms. While suggestive of fraud, this 
analysis has two limitations. First, the region-specific results cannot be generalized beyond the immediate 
region. Second, and most importantly, fraud is not the only likely explanation of the observed negative 
correlation between turnout and votes for the opposition candidate or parties. If voter preferences and 
mobilization potential are correlated—that is, if the proportion of potential pro-opposition voters who do not 
vote is higher in precincts dominated by pro-incumbent voters—these results can be explained by strategic 
voting. Finally, while fraud in vote counts is more easily distinguished from the effects of unobserved 
heterogeneity and strategic voting in natural and field experimental settings (Enikolopov, Korovkin et al. 
                                                 
2 Wahman (2015) identifies at least thirteen types of manipulations in the 2014 Malawi general election.  
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2013; Fukumoto and Horiuchi 2011), experimental studies may require substantial research resources to set 
up, and remain relatively rare.   
In contrast to the above approaches, last-digit tests are both feasible wherever precinct-specific vote  
counts are publicly available, and are robust to the presence of arbitrary levels of strategic voting and 
unobserved heterogeneity in voter preferences (Beber and Scacco 2012; Deckert, Myagkov et al. 2011; 
Lukinova, Myagkov et al. 2011). If election results are not manipulated, then the last digits in the reported 
election results should be randomly distributed. That is, there should be an (almost) equal proportion of 0s, 
1s, 2s … 9s. However, numerous studies have documented electoral fraud by identifying systematic 
deviations from these predictions. For instance, when applied to turnout counts in four consecutive Russian 
national elections (2003–2008), the last-digit test typically rejects the null hypothesis of uniformly distributed 
lasts digits (Mebane and Kalinin, 2009). A similar test applied to Sweden’s 2002 Parliamentary elections 
reveals no deviations from uniform distribution (Beber and Scacco 2012). Widely used non-parametric last 
digit fraud tests on pooled data, such as a Chi2 test are, however, silent on whether instances of fraud are 
concentrated in one or two regions or, alternatively, if fraud is spread across regions. Equally, these tests do 
not tell us whether last-digit fraud co-varies with region-specific developmental and political variations—for 
instance those related to regional education levels of fiscal dependence on the centre. We contribute to the 
literature, inter alia, by using last-digit frequency regression analysis as a multivariate extension of last-digit 
tests.  Our strategy would help scholars test sharp and well-defined predictions firmly rooted in the 
micrologic of fraud and that we are going to discuss next.  
While fraud can be perpetrated under a variety of political regimes (Argersinger 1985; Leemann and 
Bochsler 2014), recent research suggests that it is particularly widespread in autocracies, and, specifically, 
that autocrats are often keen to inflate turnout figures and votes for the winning candidate (Rundlett and 
Svolik 2016; Simpser 2013; Sjoberg 2014). Myagkov et al. (2009) and Lukinova et al. (2011) report 
suspicious turnout distributions in some of Russia’s regions and smaller rayony (sub-regional districts) where 
turnout is suspicously high and/or turnout distribution is double peaked, that is, it appears as having two 
different modes or local maxima. Consistent with Russia’s slide into authoritarianism over the last decade, 
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they find evidence that these observed empirical irregularities have gradually “metastasised” across regions 
in successive elections. Turnout- and vote-inflating electoral fraud may serve a number of related purposes.  
First, inflated turnout numbers may be used to signal to the regime’s supporters the regime’s legitimacy and 
strength. Second, inflated margins of victory can discourage the opposition and deter future challengers 
(Magaloni 2006; Simpser 2013). The literature on electoral clientelism suggests that the loyalties of a 
national regime’s clients could be fragile if the regime appears weak (Hale 2007; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 
2007; Rigger 2007). National officials therefore often expect grotesquely high—fraudulent—results to be 
delivered by their sub-national clients even if fraud is likely to be exposed. In fact, Simpser (2013) suggests 
that the ability to perpetrate blatant electoral fraud—and get away with it—may be intended deliberately as a 
signal to the autocrat’s clients that the regime is invincible.   
The literature on sub-national politics however also points to significant heterogeneity in sub-national  
development and regime types within one national setting and, relatedly, in the propensity of regional and 
local officials to perpetrate electoral misconduct (Gibson 2013; Giraudy 2013; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007;  
Lankina 2004; Lehoucq and Molina Jiménez 2002; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2007; Stokes 2007;  
Wahman 2015). Variables related to local socio-economic development (Lehoucq 2003; Lehoucq and Molina  
Jiménez 2002; Stokes 2007); the degree of fiscal dependence of a locality on the national purse (Gervasoni 
2010); regional machine politics (Eisenstadt 2004; Gel'man 2013; Gibson 2013); or media freedom (Birch 
and Ham 2014), could all affect the probability of manipulations in individual regions, or the likelihood that 
electoral results are marred with fraud rather than being products of voter choice or strategic voting. In our 
analysis, it is therefore important to perform fully parametric tests, such as multivariate regressions, that 
would control for these region-specific variations; non-parametric and univariate analyses of sub-national 
fraud heterogeneity are most likely affected by omitted variable bias and may generate spurious results.  
To illustrate the above point, let us assume that precincts with characteristics 𝑥1,, … , 𝑥𝐾,𝑖 report  
fraudulent results with probability 𝛼𝑓 = 𝛼𝑓(𝑥1,𝑖, … , 𝑥𝐾,𝑖). Factors 𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝐾 can both include precinctspecific 
variables (for instance, reported turnout) and region-specific (for instance, socio-economic) variables. 
Assume further that the probability of last-digit zeros across precincts that report clean results is 0.1, whereas 
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in precincts that report fraudulent results this probability is 𝑝𝑓 ≠ 0.1. Then the overall expected probability of 
last-digit zeros 0.1 + (𝑝𝑓 − 0.1) (𝑥1,𝑖, … , 𝑥𝐾,𝑖) is a function of factors 𝑋1, … , 𝑋𝐾 and generally deviates from 
the ten percent benchmark. The goal of our parametric analysis, then, is to test whether we observe 
systematic deviation from uniform distribution of last digits across precincts and across regions and whether 
the relative probabilities of last digits and, hence, the likelihood and magnitude of lastdigit fraud, co-vary 
with a pre-determined set of explanatory variables.  
Accordingly, and with reference to the micro-logic of fraud discussed above, we propose:  
  
H1: Sub-national last digit heterogeneity in the March 2012 Presidential elections is, in part, systematic. 
Lastdigit fraud will be observed across multiple regions.  
  
H2: Sub-national last-digit fraud will co-vary with reported turnout and with the share of votes cast for 
individual candidates including the winner Putin. This effect would be observed even when we control for 
political and socio-economic variables that have been conventionally identified as increasing or reducing the 
support for national incumbents or otherwise affecting the propensity for fraud.    
  
  Election-day fraud usually refers to ballot-stuffing, tampering with vote tallies, and other forms of 
interference with voting results (Argersinger 1985; Calingaert 2006; Cox and Kousser 1981; Gerring and 
Thacker 2004; Lehoucq 2003). Researchers have therefore pointed to limited specificity of last-digit tests as a 
forensic tool  because last-digit tests target a specific type of fraud mostly consisting of the writing in of 
made-up numbers on precinct return sheets and may not detect cases of forced voting, multiple voting, and 
ballot stuffing (Enikolopov, Korovkin et al. 2013). Furthermore, a new generation of fraud literature is 
beginning to systematically analyse not just whether a particular fraud type is perpetrated, but whether it 
occurs in conjunction with, or in lieu of, other types of irregularities (Beaulieu and Hyde 2009; Ichino and  
Schuendeln 2012; Simpser 2013; Simpser and Donno 2012; Sjoberg 2014). Research into the “menu[s] of 
manipulation” (Schedler 2002) conventionally distinguishes between pre-electoral manipulations and 
election-day fraud. Pre-electoral manipulations are widespread in settings where the electorate is dependent 
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on the public sector for welfare payments, subsidies, or contracts; in backward rural settings; or those reliant 
on national fiscal transfers. Under such conditions, political machine bosses or enterprise managers routinely 
pressurise the electorate to agree to vote for particular candidates in exchange for jobs, promises of job 
security, salaries, or public contracts (Frye, Reuter et al. 2014; Gervasoni 2010; Gibson 2013; Hale 2007; 
Rigger 2007; Sharafutdinova 2011; Stokes 2007; Wilkinson 2007). In clientelistic settings, voters are often 
compliant, knowing that private rewards will accrue to them if they vote as instructed. Compliance is less 
likely in wealthier urban areas where the electorate might be more enlightened about the public goods 
advantages of fair elections, or prosperous enough not to be seduced by small cash hand-outs (Kitschelt and  
Wilkinson 2007; Lehoucq and Molina Jiménez 2002; Magaloni, Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2007; Stokes 2007). We 
contribute to this literature by including in our analysis the Golos reports of pre-electoral manipulations and 
of election-day irregularities (discussed in Section 4). In employing Golos election-day reports of 
misconduct, we opt for the term “reporting election-day misconduct” because our aggregate Golos counts of 
citizen witness accounts of misconduct that occurred on March 4th do not allow us to distinguish between 
what would be conventionally defined as fraud—for instance, tampering with vote tallies—versus, for 
example, election-day voter intimidation, which would be conventionally labelled as “manipulations.” We 
believe that the term “election-day misconduct” best captures the plethora of fraudulent and manipulative 
activities that are detailed in the Golos report of the 2012 election (Kynev, Vahshtain et al. 2012). Prior 
literature suggests that sub-national authorities in Russia tend to resort to a variety of complementary 
strategies of misconduct that often include both citizen manipulations (like busing factory workers to the 
polling booths) and conventional election-day ballot-stuffing and other types of fraud (Hale 2007; Reisinger 
and Moraski 2009). Our analysis would help us more systematically ascertain the probability of resort to 
manipulations going beyond the writing in of made-up numbers on electoral return sheets.   
  
Accordingly, we propose :  
  




  Since reports of election-day misconduct are aggregated by region, we test H3 by proposing two new 
(yet straightforward) measures of region-specific last-digit heterogeneity that are based on the concept of 





3. Methodology  
  
3.1 Last Digit Frequencies  
  
We start by observing that, in clean elections, last digits in turnout counts reported by individual precincts 
with at least 100 registered voters can be regarded as outcomes of identical and independent multinomial  
trials where individual digits   are observed with uniform probability   (Beber and  
Scacco 2012). The parametric analysis of last-digit fraud in this paper is based, therefore, on the multinomial 
logistic regression model specified for a categorical dependent variable  that records last digits 
in turnout counts reported by individual precincts  with at least 100 registered voters. If uniform distribution 
of last digits is a property shared by all precincts across the country, it follows that the observed probabilities 
of individual last digits should be equal and, in particular, should co-vary neither with precinct-level 
variables, nor with regional political and socio-economic factors. We build on prior research that identifies 
precinct-specific and region-specific factors , for which we observe realizations  , 
that  
could affect the likelihood of election fraud and hence could “skew” the relative probabilities of individual 
last digits from the uniform benchmark.   
  Multinomial logistic regression models the relative probabilities (relative risks) of last digits as 






The choice of the base outcome or base category affects the interpretation of the estimated coefficients  
, yet it does not affect the predicted probabilities for individual last digits. In clean elections,  
regardless of the choice of the base outcome, the estimated coefficients  should be (mostly) 
statistically insignificant. Strictly speaking, after fitting regression (1) using clean elections data we can 
expect about 5 percent of coefficients to show “false positive” findings and p-values of 5 percent and lower 
due to Type I error—that is, the incorrect rejection of a true null hypothesis of clean elections. Higher 
proportions than this of statistically significant coefficients in clean elections are increasingly unlikely.   In 
fraudulent elections, where the magnitude and the exact nature of last-digit fraud generally vary with 
contextual variables, the proportion of statistically significant coefficients (1) generally depends on the 
choice of the base outcome. In these circumstances, the joint significance tests on linear hypotheses that are 
invariant to the choice of the base outcome can be particularly useful. Accordingly, for all individual 𝑋𝑘, we 
test the null hypothesis that  are jointly equal to zero for all 𝑗 ∈ {0,1, … ,9}. This tests whether there is an 
association between the corresponding independent variable 𝑋𝑘 and the ten categories of last digits and their 
relative probabilities. In addition to being invariant to the choice of the base outcome, this test is agnostic to 
the exact nature of the last-digit fraud. In other words, this test is equally good at spotting a potential 
overabundance of last digit zeros as it is good at spotting a relative scarcity of, say, 3’s.   
  The second post-estimation test after the multinomial regression (1) draws on the results of Beber and 
Scacco (2012) and Mebane and Kalinin (2009) who specifically report an overabundance of zeros in lastdigit 
frequencies in election results. The tests are focused on last-digit zeros, which may constitute a particularly 
“sensitive” category, and could provide statistical inference that is, potentially, sharper than the joint 
significance tests on all . Accordingly, our next step is to test whether there is an association between 
explanatory factors and the relative probabilities of last-digit categories 1 to 9, excluding last-digit zeros. The 
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null hypothesis in this test assumes that the true population effects (𝑗) are equal across categories 𝑗 = 1, . . ,9. 
If, for a particular predictor 𝑋𝑘, the first of the joint hypotheses (𝑗) = 0, for all  
𝑗 ∈ {0,1, … ,9} is rejected and the second hypothesis 𝛽𝑘(𝑗1) = 𝛽𝑘(𝑗2), for all 𝑗1, 𝑗2 ∈ {1, … ,9} is accepted, this 
would suggest that the corresponding 𝑋𝑘 has a differential effect on last-digit categories and that last-digit 
zeros, in particular, is the category that is affected disproportionally.   
  The final leg of the last digit analysis, therefore, relies on (binomial) logistic regressions that 
investigate the prevalence of last-digit zeros in more detail. The dependent variable equals to one if the last 
digit in the reported turnout is zero; and it is equal to zero otherwise. Considering that last-digit zeros in 
turnout counts are found to be over-reported in precincts that report particularly large (top quartile) turnout 
figures, we investigate whether the prevalence of last-digit zeros co-varies with vote counts cast for 
individual candidates. For this analysis, we use the ratio of the vote counts for individual candidates, as 
reported by precincts, to the total number of registered voters who are eligible to vote in the reporting 
precinct. This specification helps to distinguish among three alternative scenarios. First, if last-digit fraud is 
driven exclusively by the need to show higher turnout figures, which is unlikely, there is going to be no 
significant association between vote counts for individual candidates and last-digit zeros. Second, if fake 
votes that are added to the turnout figures disproportionally benefit one or two candidates, the vote counts for 
these candidates are likely to be positively correlated with last-digit turnout zeros. Finally, if last-digit zeros 
are negatively correlated with vote counts reported for some of the candidates, this would indicate that some 
of their votes have been (mis-) counted as if cast for other candidates.  
  An alternative specification to the multinomial logistic regression (1) could analyse last-digit 
frequencies aggregated by region using Poisson regressions with a panel-like analysis where cross-sectional 
index 𝑖 indicates individual regions and last-digit categories 𝑗 ∈ {0,1, … ,9} treated as individual “panels” 
collected across the regions. Even though the analysis based on Poisson-type count models could be 
informative and could potentially offer some additional insights, it can only handle voting data aggregated by 




3.2 Citizen Reports of Election-Day Misconduct   
  
The second part of our analysis focuses on citizen reports of election-day misconduct tallied by the NGO 
Golos. The report counts are available for individual regions. The aim is to test whether citizen reports of 
misconduct co-vary with last-digit fraud. Here, the dependent count variable, the number of Golos reports of 
election-day misconduct, is regressed on the variables of interest while controlling for the number of Golos 
reports of pre-electoral manipulations occurring during the electoral campaign in the same region. This 
specification allows us to control for the unobserved factors common to election-day and pre-electoral 
manipulations, such as region-specific propensity to report. As the count-dependent variable is characterised 
by overdispersion (or extra-Poisson variation), we use negative binomial regressions. We also control for the 
total number of polling stations in the region, as election-day reports are likely to pertain to individual polling 
stations where individual instances of fraud are taking place. A region with a relatively higher rate of 
election-day fraud, but with fewer polling stations (lower n) might have fewer total instances of reported 
irregularities.   
  Our measure of region-specific last-digit fraud—the key explanatory factor in this analysis—is based 
on the likelihood ratio statistic  that is defined as  
  
where   is the observed frequency of digit  in region ,   is the expected frequency 
of digit , and   is the total number of polling stations in the region. Relatively larger values of , for a 
fixed , indicate that last digits are distributed relatively less evenly and hence are consistent with more 
widespread last-digit fraud. The likelihood ratio statistic  relates to the concept of deviance in the theory of 
Generalized Linear Models and this statistic and Pearson’s Chi2 represent the two most commonly used 
measures of  
“goodness of fit” between the observed and the expected outcomes of categorical data (Agresti 1990). The 
two measures both converge to a  (in our case,  ) distribution and give very close answers in large 
samples where the expected frequencies  in all categories have values of 5 or greater (our data comfortably 
14  
  
satisfy this requirement). Between deviance  and Pearson’s Chi2 we prefer to use   as this measure has 
an attractive additivity property and can be easily partitioned into independent chi-squares. Specifically, we 
define   
 
, and  
  
It is easy to see that  and that the total deviance (that is, heterogeneity) in 
last-digit frequencies is split into two parts. While  is approximately  and measures the 
part of the total heterogeneity that is due to under- or over-reported last digit zeros, is 
approximately and measures the heterogeneity across digits 1 to 9. This allows us to test the 
independent effect of excess zeros on election-day misconduct reports, while controlling for last-digit 
heterogeneity that comes from digits 1 to 9.  
  When  and   are used in regression analysis as measures of fraud, we ought to  
control for (region-specific) sample size  —the total number of polling stations in the region. This is due to 
the fact that deviance measures of fit both reflect the amount of region-specific fraud and the (regionspecific) 
power of the statistical tests at the same time. This is easy to see: if the sample size  and all  
frequencies are multiplied by a factor , so are   and  . Clearly, a region with  
relatively less fraud, but with more polling stations (larger n) might end up having higher deviance statistics 
than a region with more fraud and fewer polling stations (smaller n). As a result, if sample size  is omitted 
from the regression specification and if  varies systematically with any of the regressors, the estimates are 
likely to be biased. Accordingly, we model the expected number of citizen reports of election-day 





   
where control variables include, among others, , and  
. In this specification, a 1% increase in   is assosiated with a  % increase in the rate of  
citizen reports of misconduct on election day, controlling for other factors, that is, “as if” all regions had 
equal numbers of polling stations and “as if” all regions had similar propensities to report irregularities. A 1% 
increase in  results in a  % increase in the rate of citizen and election monitor 
complaints.    The two parts of the analysis (the multinomial/logit analysis of last-digit frequencies on the 
one hand and the analysis of citizen reports of irregularities, on the other) are closely linked and should be 
interpreted together. If last-digit tests reveal that the frequencies of last-digit zeros are relatively more 
sensitive to factors such as turnout and that the frequencies of digits 1 to 9 are relatively less sensitive, 
hypothesis H3 would expect election-day misconduct reports to be relatively stronger correlated with the 
systematic part of lastdigit heterogeneity, namely 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒0,, and not nessesarily correlated with its 
relatively less systematic and more random 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒1−9,.  
  
4. Data and measures  
  
Outcome variables. We employ precinct data for the 2012 Presidential elections obtained from the Russian 
Electoral Commission website. The election featured five contenders (several others had been excluded from 
the race). Aside from the Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, there were two seasoned contenders with a long 
history of participation in Russia’s presidential races—Gennadiy Zyuganov, the candidate from the 
established Communist Party of the Russian Federation (CPRF); and Vladimir Zhirinovsky, the candidate 
from the Liberal-Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR). The two other candidates were Sergey Mironov, 
representing the pro-Kremlin Just Russia Party; and Mikhail Prokhorov, an independent, party-unaffiliated, 
candidate and one of Russia’s leading industrialists, whom some analysts considered a “Kremlin project” 
despite his criticism of the politics of the Putin-Medvedev tandem. Putin obtained 63.6 of the total vote; 
while Zyuganov, Zhirinovsky, Mironov, and Prokhorov obtained 17.2; 6.2; 3.9; and 8 percent of the vote, 
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respectively. In our analysis, we employ turnout and vote count statistics for each candidate that cover 95,415 
precinct-level (uchastkovye) polling stations subordinated to the regional Territorial Electoral Commissions  
(territorial’nye izbiratel’nye komissii).     
  The first outcome variable is Fraud. The measures for this variable are last digits 𝑗𝑖 ∈ {0,1, … ,9} in 
turnout counts reported by individual precincts 𝑖 with at least 100 registered voters. The second 
(regionallevel) outcome variable, Reporting election-day misconduct, is the number of election-day reports 
of irregularities filed by citizens and election monitors and tallied by the NGO Golos  (Kynev, Vahshtain et 
al.  
2012). In September 2011, Golos created a special “hotline” inviting citizens to post reports of observed 
preelectoral and election-day misconduct. Subsequently, these reports served as the basis for constructing a 
regularly updated geographic “map of irregularities” (karta narusheniy). The portal also has a search engine 
that enables analysts to obtain quantitative data on electoral misconduct by region. An example of 
electionday fraud reports would be election monitors or ordinary citizens supplying video footage of electoral 
officials tampering with ballots. An example of other types of irregularities observed on election-day would 
be election monitors being forced out of a polling station by a police officer.  
  
Key independent variables. Our key independent variables are Turnout; vote counts for individual  
Presidential candidates (Putin’s vote, Zyuganov’s vote, Zhirinovsky’s vote, Mironov’s vote, and 
Prokhorov’s Vote) taken as ratios to the total number of registered voters who are eligible to vote in the 
reporting precinct; and the two measures of last-digit heterogeneity in turnout counts 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝟎,𝒊 and  
𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝟏−𝟗,𝒊.  
    
Control variables. As noted above, we use the region-level measure for Reporting pre-electoral 
manipulations to control for the general propensity to report manipulations. Examples of reported 
preelectoral manipulations would be complaints that enterprise managers pressurise employees to cast a vote 
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for Putin; or a student reporting being threatened with expulsion from university for canvassing for 
opposition candidates. Conventionally, regional variations in electoral misconduct have been explained in 
terms of differences in regional socio-economic conditions; education; the degree to which regions are 
fiscally dependent on the federal centre; ethnic structure; and strength of regional political machines. By 
explicitly controlling for these variables in the regression analysis, we test if Putin’s vote is independently 
associated with last-digit fraud over and above the effects associated with regional political and socio-
economic factors. It is also important to note that, to the extent that Reporting election-day misconduct may 
proxy for factors not directly related to fraud such as citizen propensity to report manipulations and fraud, the 
explanatory power of last-digit fraud (deviance) measures is likely to be weakened by the inclusion of a 
comprehensive set of the relevant control variables. Furthermore, some scholars have suggested that pre-
electoral manipulations make election-day irregularities superfluous. We therefore employ data available 
from  
Russia’s yearly official statistical compilations to incorporate the variables of Income per capita; 
geographical Distance from Moscow (in ‘000s km); the proportion of population with University degree;  
and Fiscal transfers as a share of regional budgets, to capture citizen socio-economic vulnerabilities (and 
corresponding propensity to succumb to pressures to deliver a pro-incumbent vote or to challenge electoral 
misconduct); the potential effect of geographic proximity to the national centre of power; regional 
developmental variations, notably citizen education levels which could capture propensity to tolerate and 
report misconduct; and degree of regional financial dependence on the federal centre. In addition, we employ 
two variables that capture variations in regional ethnic composition and that had been in previous research 
linked to sub-national electoral clientelism and machine politics. Specifically, regions with the status of 
ethnically-defined republics and those with substantial non-ethnically Russian populations tend to be more 
likely to produce anomalously high voting in favour of pro-Kremlin candidates and parties in national 
elections. These patterns have been explained with reference to Soviet-era ethno-patronage networks 
whereby non-Russian groups received material transfers from the federal centre in exchange for loyalty. To 
capture these “correlates of clientelism” (Hale 2007), we employ the variables of the share of ethnic  
Russians in regional populations; and regional status (Oblast). Further robustness tests control for  
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Urbanisation, which tends to co-vary with our Fiscal Transfers and with University degree variables; and  
Media freedom, a variable employed in other studies of electoral malpractice (Birch and Ham 2014;  
Wilkinson 2007) and which we capture by employing an index developed by scholars at the Moscow 
Carnegie Centre, a respected think tank (Petrov and Titkov 2013). The index encompasses regional media 
pluralism, censorship, and independence of media sources from municipal and regional authorities.   
  
5. Analysis  
  
We begin with non-parametric last-digit tests in turnout counts, valid vote counts, and votes cast for the 
winner Vladimir Putin in the March 2012 Presidential elections ignoring the differences across individual 
regions for now. In accordance with prior literature that applied last-digit tests to electoral fraud, we exclude 
polling stations with less than one hundred registered voters; this reduces the sample size from 95,415 to 
91,114 precincts. Table 1 reports that, based on the likelihood ratio L2 statistics, the null hypothesis of 
uniformly distributed last digits is rejected for turnout counts and valid vote counts. The test results for the 
sub-sample of precincts that exclude ethnic republics are only marginally weaker than those for the full 
sample. This suggests that instances of fraud are not limited to ethnic republics. Secondly, Beber and Scacco 
(2012) suggest that deviations from uniform distribution in last-digit frequencies are often caused by an 
overabundance of zeros. The hypothesis that assumes that the probability of last-digit zeros is 10 percent is 
tested against the sample statistics Deviance0 and is rejected for turnout counts, valid vote counts, and votes 
cast for the winner Putin (in the full sample). Thirdly, the hypothesis of uniform distribution of digits 1 to 9 
(excluding last digit zeros) is tested against the sample statistics Deviance1-9 and is rejected for turnout 
counts. Figure 1 plots the proportions of last digits in turnout counts and their 95% confidence intervals 
estimated after a univariate multinomial logistic regression. Overall, these results confirm the presence of 
last-digit fraud in the elections and reveal the fact of marked over-reporting of last-digit zeros in particular.    
  Though informative, these non-parametric fraud tests mask important heterogeneity across regions.  
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We illustrate this heterogeneity, first, by performing region-specific last-digit Chi2(9) tests on turnout counts 
reported by precincts in individual regions. The region-specific tests are based on L2 statistics (see section 
3.2) and each yields a p-value. Figure 2 reports the p-values histogram that shows significant degree of 
pvalues heterogeneity. In individual tests, we usually reject the null hypothesis of no fraud if the 
corresponding p-value is below the 5 or 10 percent cut-off level. This approach would not be adequate here, 
however. With seventy-nine tests corresponding to seventy-nine regions for which data are available (out of 
Russia’s eighty-three constituent regions),3 we can expect a number of regions to fall into the rejection area 
purely by chance. Indeed, if turnout counts across individual regions had been generated by a fair vote count, 
the p-values would be distributed uniformly. Similarly, if last-digit fraud affects only a small number of 
regions, the distribution of p-values would be near uniform. In contrast, any significant deviation from 
uniform distribution would signal that last-digit fraud affects a significant proportion of individual regions. 
We test whether the p-values come from uniform distribution by performing the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) 
test which ascertains the extent of equality of distributions. The test weakly rejects the hypothesis that the 
pvalues are uniformly distributed (K-S p-value 0.053), suggesting that (a) regions differ in their propensity to 
generate statistically unlikely last digits in turnout counts; and that (b) last-digit fraud seems to be affecting a 
significant proportion of individual regions.  
  If deviations from uniform distribution in last-digit frequencies are caused by an overabundance of 
zeros (Beber and Scacco 2012), the Chi2(1) tests against sample statistics Deviance0, focused on last-digit 
zeros, should be sharper than Chi2(9) tests against L2. Accordingly, Figure 3 shows the histogram of p-values 
after region-specific Chi2(1) tests based on Deviance0. Again, the results show considerable variation in the 
p-values, with lower p-values favouring the fraud hypothesis. In particular, the probability of last-digit zeros 
in turnout counts appears to be significantly different from 10 percent in Bashkortostan, Dagestan,  
                                                 
3 Chechnya and regions with autonomous okrug status are conventionally excluded from cross-regional 
statistical analyses because of missing data.   
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Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, Kemerovo, Magadan, North-Ossetia, Sakhalin, Stavropol, and 
Tatarstan. As before, we employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test that, this time, strongly rejects the hypothesis 
of uniform distribution (K-S p-value 0.001), confirming that the p-value heterogeneity is, in part, systematic. 
Since fraud is the most likely causal mechanism that could generate the systematic component in the p-value 
heterogeneity, our analysis confirms hypothesis H1 about the incidence of fraud in the elections. The strong 
results of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test also suggest that last-digit fraud was not a problem specific to one or 
two individual regions (if this were the case, the K-S statistics would not have picked that up). The results 
suggest instead that the number of regions across Russia that were affected by last-digit fraud was 
sufficiently high for the test to reject the joint hypothesis of uniform distribution.  
  
5.1 Regression Analysis of Last Digits: Fake Votes and Vote “Re-distribution”    
  
We now proceed with regression analysis. In this section, we test whether last-digit fraud co-varies with 
turnout and with vote counts for individual candidates (hypothesis H2) controlling for conventional correlates 
of electoral misconduct. The Dagestan region comes out as a statistical “outlier” in terms of last-digit fraud.  
The expected number of last-digit zeros in Dagestan under uniform distribution is 170.7 against the observed 
322 that yields a remarkable Chi2(1) statistic of 121.53. We therefore exclude Dagestan from the regression 
analysis and report results for the remaining seventy-eight regions. Including Dagestan strengthens the key 
results of our regression analysis, and yet, on balance, we do not want the results to be influenced by this 
idiosyncratically fraudulent region. Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the regression analysis and 
the correlation matrix are presented in the Supplemental Appendix (SA Tables 1 and 2).  
  Table 2 reports results of the multivariate logit regression where we regress last-digit categories in 
turnout counts on four quartiles of Turnout, and on the control variables University degree, Distance from 
Moscow, Fiscal transfers, and Russians. Turnout quartiles control for possible effect of non-linearity. 
Cluster-robust standard errors are used to allow for intragroup correlations in seventy-eight regions. Figure 4 
plots predicted probabilities of last-digits across turnout quartiles and illustrates the key result that last-digit 
zeros are significantly over-reported in precincts reporting turnout levels in the fourth quartile (that is, 
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Turnout of at least 79 percent or greater). The graph illustrates that the Turnout effect on over-reported zeros 
is mostly concentrated in the fourth quartile, although the overall linear effect, when Turnout is entered as a 
continuous variable, is positive and statistically significant (unreported). Tables 3 and 4 report postestimation 
tests. Table 3 reports that the 4th Quartile turnout dummy is jointly statistically significant in all categories of 
last digits, rejecting the hypothesis of no association between last-digit frequencies and the 4th Quartile 
(versus the 1st Quartile) turnout. Among other effects, University degree and Distance from Moscow are 
statistically significant, further suggesting that last-digit heterogeneity is partly systematic and nonrandom. 
Based on the results in Table 4, on the other hand, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no association between 
last-digit frequencies 1 to 9 (excluding last-digit zeros) and the 4th Quartile (vs. 1st Quartile) turnout, which 
suggests that a systematic component associated with Turnout is mostly carried by last-digit zeros.  
Last-digit zeros also seem to be carrying a systematic component associated with Distance from Moscow. 
These results are robust to the use of alternative control variables and do not change when Oblast, Income, 
and Media freedom are included (Russians and Fiscal transfers are excluded due to potential 
multicollinearity issues). Oblast, Income, and Media freedom do not emerge as statistically significant.   
 Table 5 reports the results of a (binomial) logit model which explores last-digit zeros in detail. The dependent 
variable in Table 5 is a dummy variable where last-digit zeros in turnout counts are coded as ‘1’s and the 
other last-digit categories are coded as ‘0’s. While model M2, Table 5, uses the specification identical to the 
one used earlier in Table 2 and reports similar results, model M3 introduces vote counts for individual 
candidates (Putin’s vote, Zyuganov’s vote, Zhirinovsky’s vote, Mironov’s vote, and Prokhorov’s vote) as 
new explanatory variables in place of Turnout. Vote counts for individual candidates are taken as a ratio to 
the number of registered voters and are split into quartiles to control for possible effects of non-linearity. 
Putin’s vote yields statistically significant results—we observe a 0.138 increase in predicted log-odds of 
lastdigit zeros in the 4th Quartile of Putin’s vote (that is, Putin’s vote is at least 56 percent of registered voters 
or greater) relative to the 1st Quartile (Putin’s vote is 33.5 percent of registered voters or less). This, together 
with the earlier results for turnout strongly suggests that turnout counts include fake votes that produce 
overreported last-digit zeros, and that fake votes disproportionally benefit Putin. Figure 5 illustrates this by 
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plotting the predicted probabilities of last-digit zeros across four quartiles of Putin’s vote. Controlling for the 
effect of Putin’s vote, vote counts reported for candidate Mironov are negatively correlated with overreported 
last-digit zeros in turnout counts. This suggests that fraud activities involved a number of strategies. In 
addition to propping up Putin’s vote and turnout counts with fake votes, some election officials were actively 
stealing and re-distributing the actual votes. The evidence suggests that Mironov’s vote (a proKremlin 
candidate) was particularly badly affected by this vote “re-distribution.” Figure 6 illustrates this by plotting 
the predicted probabilities of last-digit zeros across four quartiles of Mironov’s vote, holding other variables 
at their means. University degree and Distance from Moscow are positively associated with lastdigit fraud 
and emerge as statistically significant, while Fiscal transfers and Russians do not seem to have an 
independent effect on fraud. The result for the University degree variable may be interpreted as follows. In 
regions with educated populations, regional officials may opt for election-day fraud in lieu of pre-electoral 
manipulations—like pressurising citizens to cast a vote for a particular party or candidate—because 
bettereducated voters are less likely to succumb to such pressures.  The Distance from Moscow variable may 
capture the effects of fraud in, for instance, the North Caucasus regions, which are notoriously associated 
with delivering implausibly high results for Kremlin-supported parties and presidential candidates. It could 
also capture distance from the West and from diffusion processes associated with proximity to democratic 
countries and the EU, which, in previous studies have been found to positively affect regional democracy  
(Lankina and Getachew 2006, 2008; Obydenkova and Libman 2012, 2015). Overall, the evidence supports 
Hypothesis 2. The results are robust to the inclusion of alternative control variables Oblast, Media freedom, 
Urbanization, and Income.  
  
5.2 Reports of Election-Day Misconduct  
  
In this section, we investigate if our measures of last-digit fraud co-vary with Golos’s regional reports of 
misconduct (H3). Models M4-M11, Table 6, report the results of a series of negative binomial regressions. 
Dagestan is excluded as an outlier. In the benchmark model M4, the dependent variable Reporting 
electionday misconduct is regressed on a set of control variables excluding our measures of fraud. As 
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expected, Reporting election-day misconduct is found to be larger in those regions which reported more pre-
electoral manipulations (Reporting pre-electoral manipulations), which, in part, controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity in general propensity to report across individual regions. Pre-electoral manipulation reports 
both are likely to proxy for the electorate that values fair elections and also for the pressure on regional 
authorities to deliver the desired result on the election-day. The observed positive correlation between 
preelectoral and election-day reports is consistent with both of these effects. Second, as expected, regions 
with more polling stations tend to generate more reports of election-day irregularities. Finally, as expected, 
education (University degree) is positively and significantly associated with election-day reports ceteris 
paribus, while Distance from Moscow is negatively associated with election-day reports. Russians emerge as 
only weakly statistically significant, suggesting, counter-intuitively, that regions with a higher proportion of 
ethnically-Russian populations tend to show a lower likelihood of exposing election-day misconduct than do 
those with larger non-ethnically Russian populations. This effect however disappears when we include the 
last-digit fraud variable into the regression.  
  Model M5 introduces our preferred measure of fraud prevalence 𝑳(𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝟎), which is found to 
be positively and significantly correlated with fraud reports in support of hypothesis H3. A 10% increase in 
𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝟎 is associated with a 1.10.140 − 1 ≈ 1.3% increase in fraud reports. This is an important finding. 
We show in the previous section that last-digit zeros are not entirely random and that variance in last-digit 
zeros is partly systematic. Fake turnout counts and over-reported zeros produce higher values of  
𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝟎 statistics (“fingerprints of fraud”), which are found to be associated with fraud reports. Here, we 
do not claim that the empirical relationship between last-digit fraud and fraud reports is necessarily causal.  
As we discussed earlier, last-digit fraud measures such as 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝟎 might not detect all instances of forced 
voting and ballot stuffing that could be more readily observed and reported by monitors. Our results, 
therefore, are consistent with the view that regional authorities, eager to “deliver,” resort to a variety of 
complementary election-day strategies. Models M6 and M7 report that the relatively less systematic and 
more random part of last-digit heterogeneity 𝑫𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒂𝒏𝒄𝒆𝟏−𝟗 measured across digits 1 to 9 is not associated 
with misconduct reports, neither on its own nor when the effect of last-digit zeros is being controlled for. The 
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association between last-digit fraud and misconduct reports is robust to the inclusion of alternative controls. 
Models M8 to M11 report results that include Oblast and Income, while Fiscal transfers and Russians are 
excluded due to potential multicollinearity. The effect of last-digit fraud on misconduct reports is somewhat 






6. Discussion  
  
Our analysis of last-digit fraud in Russia’s presidential elections points to a significant degree of sub-national 
fraud heterogeneity. The evidence confirms that fraud tended to be higher in regions with a history of 
“deference” (Moraski and Reisinger 2010) to the Kremlin—for instance, the North Caucasus republics. 
Lastdigit fraud is associated with (a) fake turnout counts; (b) fake votes that disproportionally benefitted 
Vladimir  
Putin; and (c) vote “re-distribution” whereby votes cast for some candidates appear to have been 
systematically miscounted. We document further that Golos’s regional reports of election-day irregularities 
are correlated with last-digit fraud, suggesting that regional authorities use a menu of complementary 
strategies to produce the desired outcome.  
  The parametric last-digit frequency regressions employed in this paper could be extended to study 
fraud heterogeneity in further detail. For instance, we could ask questions such as: “Is the association 
between turnout and over-reported last-digit zeros stronger/ weaker in relatively larger precincts with higher 
number of registered voters?” Consistent with recent analyses of strategic selection of fraud location in 
different settings (Sjoberg 2014), it could be argued that the most efficient way to use fraud to win a plurality 
of votes in direct elections would be to channel fraud efforts to larger, more consequential, precincts.  
25  
  
Systematic resort to fraud would, then, produce stronger turnout-fraud links in larger precincts—this could be 
easily tested by including appropriate interaction terms in last-digit frequency regressions.         
  The systematic evidence that we present of election officials strategically re-allocating votes from one 
of the pro-Kremlin contenders in favour of the winner-apparent is also significant in terms of possibilities for 
further extensions and research. Specifically, we find that votes for Mironov, the pro-Kremlin candidate, had 
been particularly vulnerable to such manipulative tactics. These practices suggest that having a number of 
contenders ostensibly representing the political opposition serves a wider purpose beyond simply seeking to 
create the impression of a genuinely competitive political process.  In fact, we conjecture that such politicians 
may be deliberately planted into the electoral race to generate votes that could be reallocated to the 
winnerapparent without the risk of being challenged by the “loser” in the courts, the media, etc.  
  Our findings, based on an analysis of Golos data, also tentatively suggest that last-digit fraud occurs 
even in settings where pre-electoral manipulations are widespread. Intuitively, one would expect that 
election-day fraud would be unnecessary where, for instance, manipulations like vote-buying would have 
ensured citizen commitment to vote for a particular candidate prior to the day of the election (Magaloni, 
Diaz-Cayeros et al. 2007; Stokes 2007). Thus, Susan Stokes, an expert on political clientelism in various 
national contexts, writes how after “a long day of handing out goods and favours at Children's Day 
celebrations” one Argentinian party activist boasted: “Votes will come. I don't have to go and look for them .  
. . votes will come anyway” (cited in Stokes 2007). Nevertheless, what we find is more in line with 
alternative arguments that the two types of misconduct co-vary—both are perpetrated to augment a 
proregime result (Hale 2007).    
  The analysis presented in this paper has wider implications for understanding Russia’s centre-regional 
relations; regional electoral dynamics; and the effects of sub-national variations in socio-economic conditions 
and regime types on national electoral outcomes. Despite Putin’s recentralisation reforms—which had the 
effect of undermining political pluralism in the hitherto more democratic regions—, we observe 
intertemporal continuity in the reproduction of regional patterns of electoral malpractice. In what dovetails 
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with earlier research, we find that these variations are in turn to a certain extent conditioned by variables like 
levels of regional modernization and specifically education (Hale 2007; Lankina 2012, 2016; Lankina and  
Getachew 2008; Saikkonen 2015). Despite the Kremlin’s protestations to the effect that fawning governors in 
some regions are simply “trying too hard” to please the national regime in delivering implausibly high 
results, our analysis is more suggestive of the fact that fraud and other irregularities are perpetrated where 
regional authorities feel that they can get away with them and where they possess significant levers of 
influence over citizens. In other words, capacity to deliver, not so much the extent of loyalty to the Kremlin, 
is what drives the extent of electoral malpractice under a regime where in any case most of the regional 
assemblies and governorships are controlled by the Kremlin. Thus, during the December 2011 Parliamentary 
elections, a mere presence of independent observers at Moscow’s polling stations reportedly decreased the 
vote for the Kremlin-supported United Russia party by 11 percent (Enikolopov, Korovkin et al. 2013). True, 
on the eve of the 2012 presidential elections, Russia’s leaders made a conscious effort to give the impression 
of striving for electoral integrity, not least because of citizen anger at fraud perpetrated in the State Duma 
elections in December 2011.  Web-cameras were introduced in polling stations; and pronouncements were 
made encouraging citizens to show vigilance in exposing fraud. Yet, we also know that governors were 
punished for failing to deliver a robust result in favour of the Kremlin-supported parties in the 2011 elections, 
and that every effort was made to secure Putin’s victory in the first round of the Presidential elections that 
followed. A number of governors—in Vologda, Arkhangelsk, and Volgograd—had been arguably dismissed 
because of a “weak” result in December 2011. The Golos report contains evidence that regional governors, 
perhaps conscious of these pressures from above, are likely to have directed the process of securing the 
desired vote: they threatened to cut funding to the rayony (sub-regional districts) unless precinct officials 
deliver at least a 50, and as high as a 60-70 percent vote for Putin; fired officials who failed to deliver a high 
enough result for the United Russia “party of power” in December 2011; and promoted officials in the rayony 
in which allegations of fraud—and court cases—in the previous elections featured prominently, in other 
words, signalling that fraudsters would be rewarded rather than punished (Kynev, Vahshtain et al. 2012). 
There are also numerous cases of precinct officials resigning in protest against governor pressures to commit 
fraud. Furthermore, Golos had been subjected to state-sponsored harassment both before and after the March 
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2012 presidential elections. Against this background, and against the findings of our own statistical analysis, 
the Kremlin’s protestations about a desire to ensure a transparent vote ring hollow.  
  Our findings also dovetail with other, longer-term, analyses of electoral dynamics in Russia.  
Reisinger and Moraski find that high levels of regional “deference” to the Kremlin have in recent years 
tended to extend even to the traditionally less “deferential” regions (Reisinger and Moraski 2009), while  
Lukinova et al. use the metaphor of “metastesized” fraud to describe the cancer-like spread of electoral 
malpractice across Russia (Lukinova, Myagkov et al. 2011).  Generally, it is well-known that there has been a 
significant erosion of sub-national democratic institutions and electoral competition under Putin (Golosov  
2011; Panov and Ross 2013; Reddaway and Orttung 2005; Reuter and Remington 2009; Reuter and Buckley 
2015; Reuter and Robertson 2012; Rochlitz 2014). Yet, this unfavourable national context notwithstanding, 
in these various studies, some regions consistently feature as among the worst abusers of citizens’ right to 
cast a democratic vote, while others continue to feature greater levels of electoral integrity. Similar to other 
autocratic regimes, Putin’s Kremlin has shown remarkable ingenuity in skewing the electoral playing field in 
its favour—through blatant fraud and other, more “subtle” techniques like potential vote redistribution 
between pro-Kremlin candidates and the winner-apparent, that we uncovered.  Yet, the electorate in many 
regions continues to show a certain degree of vigilance in exposing both the pre-electoral and election-day 
misconduct. Likewise, NGOs like Golos and its regional activists, as indeed local election monitoring NGOs 
and other civil society groups continue to fulfil their civic duties despite the very difficult and hostile climates 
in which they operate. The reproduction of such spatial variations in democratic practices and processes 
despite authoritarian consolidation under Putin in turn suggests that longer-term sub-national developmental 
trajectories, which condition regional resilience to national autocracy, matter (Lankina, Libman et al. 2016, 
2016). Careful attention to sub-national democratic practices, transcending the preoccupation with national-
level authoritarian retrenchment, is therefore essential for nuancing our understanding of the nature of 
Russia’s current regime, and indeed for appreciating the potential for future political change in Russia.     
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Tables and Figures  
Table 1. Last-Digit Tests (Likelihood-ratio Chi2) for last-digit frequencies in turnout counts, valid vote 
counts, and votes cast for Putin; March 2012 Presidential elections.  
   Turnout  Valid votes  Vote count, winner  
  Full  
sample  
 Excl.  Full   Excl.  





    




  52.61**   23.98**  40.70**  16.22  14.84  9.67  
P-value  0.000   0.004  0.000  0.063  
  
H0: The probability of last-digit zeros is 10 %  
0.095  0.377  
Deviance0  
chi2(1)  
  33.13**   7.82**  27.74**  4.24*  4.09*  2.98  
P-value  0.000   0.005  0.000  0.040  
  
H0: Last digits 1 to 9 are distributed uniformly  
0.043  0.084  
Deviance1-9  
chi2(8)  





 0.040  0.113  0.152  





N obs.  91,114   72,353  91,114  72,353  91,114  72,353  
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 Notes: ** - indicates the rejection of the corresponding H0 at the 1% level; * - at the 5% 
level.  
  
    
Figure 1. Proportions of Last Digits in Turnout Counts (based on univariate multinomial logistic regression) 
with 95% Confidence Intervals.  
 
  
     
  




Figure 2. Region-specific last-digit tests: the histogram of Chi2(9) p-values that correspond to regionspecific 
𝐿2 statistics in voter turnout counts.  
 
Note: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test weakly rejects the hypothesis that p-values are uniformly distributed 
(K-S p-value 0.053), suggesting that regions differ in their propensity to generate statistically unlikely 
lastdigits in turnout counts.  
    
Figure 3. Region-specific last-digit zero tests: the histogram of Chi2(1) p-values that correspond to 
regionspecific Deviance0 statistics in voter turnout counts.  
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Note: The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test strongly rejects the hypothesis that the p-values are uniformly 









Table 2. Last-Digit Fraud in Turnout Counts, Multinomial Logistic Regression a; Dagestan is excluded.  
  
Categories (Last Digits):  
0  
(base)  
1 vs 0  2 vs 0  3 vs 0  4 vs 0   5 vs 0  6 vs 0  7 vs 0  8 vs 0  9 vs 0  
Turnout b                2nd Quartile  
  
3rd Quartile  
  

























































University degree  



















Distance from Moscow  



















Fiscal transfers  



























































Obs  87,720                 
Wald chi2(63)  476.42                 
Notes: a Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses allow for intragroup correlations in 78 regions; ** - indicates significance at the 1% level; * - at the 5% level.  




Figure 4. Predicted probabilities of turnout last digits by turnout quantiles (based on Table 
2) with 95% confidence intervals.  
  
 
Notes: Other explanatory variables are taken at their means.  
Turnout Quartiles: 1st — 58.7% of registered voters or less; 2nd — between 58.7% and 66.0% ; 3rd — 




    
Table 3. Wald tests of composite hypothesis (all digits) after multivariate logit reported in 
Table 2.   
  
 
H0: There is no association between the corresponding explanatory variable and the ten 
categories of last digits. H0 assumes that true population effects in categories 0 to 9 in Table 2 
are jointly equal to zero.  
  
Independent variables              Chi2 (9)                                       p-value  
Turnout  
2nd Quartile  
3rd Quartile  







University degree  24.86**  .0031  
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Distance from Moscow  19.32*  .0226  
Fiscal transfers  9.71  .3748  
Russians  6.23  .7162  
Notes: ** - indicates the rejection of the corresponding H0 at the 1% level; * - at the 5% level.  
  





Table 4. Wald tests of composite hypotheses (digits 1 to 9) after multivariate logit reported in 
Table 2.   
  
 
H0: There is no association between the corresponding explanatory variable and the relative 
frequencies of last-digit categories 1 to 9 (that is, excluding last-digit zeros). H0 assumes that true 
population effects in categories 1 to 9 in Table 2 are equal.  
  
Independent variables               Chi2 (8)                                       p-value  
Turnout  
2nd Quartile  
3rd Quartile  







University degree  19.87*  .0109  
Distance from Moscow  10.07  .2603  
Fiscal transfers  9.60  .2942  
Russians  5.52  .7007  
Notes: ** - indicates the rejection of the corresponding H0 at the 1% level; * - at the 5% level.  
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Table 5. Last-digit zeros in turnout counts, logistic regressions a; Dagestan is excluded.  
  
Variables  M2  St. Err.  M3  St. Err.  
Turnout b      
2nd Quartile .017  (.025)    
3rd Quartile .026  (.032)      
4th Quartile .135**  (.033)      
Putin’s vote b        
2nd Quartile   .001  (.036)  
3rd Quartile      .023  (.041)  
4th Quartile .    .138**  (.045)  
Zyuganov’s vote b        
2nd Quartile   -.002  (.041)  
3rd Quartile      -.006  (.035)  
4th Quartile  .    .010  (.035)  
Zhirinovsky’s vote b        
2nd Quartile   .014  (.038)  
3rd Quartile      .039  (.039)  
4th Quartile  .    .006  (.039)  
Mironov’s vote b         
2nd Quartile   -.032  (.036)  
3rd Quartile      -.049  (.036)  
4th Quartile  .    -.115**  (.036)  
Prokhorov’s vote b         
2nd Quartile   .006  (.041)  
3rd Quartile      .047  (.043)  
4th Quartile  .    .044  (.049)  
University degree  .448*  (.211)  .510*  (.231)  
Distance from Moscow  .022**  (.007)  .020**  (.007)  
Fiscal transfers  -.027  (.122)  -.021  (.125)  




Constant  -2.25**  (.091)  -2.26**  (.101)  
Obs  87,720    87,720    
Clusters (regions)  78    78    
Wald Chi2  45.15    69.62    
Notes:   
a Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses allow for intragroup correlations in 78 regions;  
b Quartile categories represent dummy variables where first quartile is treated as the reference outcome.  




Figure 5. Predicted probabilities of turnout last-digit zeros by quartiles of Putin’s vote 
(based on M3, Table 5) with 95% confidence intervals.  
  
 
Notes: Other explanatory variables are taken at their means.  
Putin’s Vote Quartiles: 1st — 33.5% of registered voters or less; 2nd — between 33.5% and 41.8% ; 3rd — 
between 41.8% and 56%; 4th — 56% or greater.  
  
    
 
1 2 3 4 




Figure 6. Predicted probabilities of turnout last-digit zeros by quartiles of Mironov’s vote 
(based on M3, Table 5) with 95% confidence intervals.  
 
Notes: Other explanatory variables are taken at their means.  
Mironov’s Vote Quartiles: 1st — 1.3% of registered voters or less; 2nd — between 1.3% and 2.2% ; 3rd — 




Table 6. Reports of election-day misconduct, Golos data, negative binomial regressions; 
Dagestan is excluded.  
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Quartiles of Mironov's Vote  
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𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒0)   
(Last Digit Fraud Index 
based on observed 
frequencies of Last  













𝐿𝑜𝑔 (𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒1 9)  
based  
on relative frequencies 
of last digits 1 to 9)  
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Obs.  78  78  78  78  78  78  78  78  
LR Chi2  100.30  109.97  100.33  110.00  96.57  109.20  96.58  109.21  
Log pseudolikelihood  -432.70  -427.87  -432.68  -427.85  -434.57  -428.25  -434.56  -428.25  
Pseudo R2  .1039  .1139  .1039  .1139  .1000  .1131  .1000  .1131  
Notes: Dependent variable is Reporting election-day misconduct (number of reports of election-day misconduct 
per region). Standard errors in parentheses; ** - indicates significance at the 1% level; * - at the 5% level.  
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Supplemental Appendix  
  
Table 1. Variables, definitions, and descriptive statistics; Dagestan is excluded.  
  Definition  N  Mean  St. dev  Min  Median  Max  
(1) Turnout  The number of votes cast divided by the number of people    
eligible to vote (registered voters)  
87,720  0.68  0.14  0.05  0.65  1  
(2) Putin’s vote  The number of votes cast for Putin divided by the number of 
registered voters  
87,720  0.46  0.17  0  0.41  1  
(3) Zyuganov’s vote  The number of votes cast for Zyuganov divided by the number of 
registered voters  
87,720  0.11  0.05  0  0.11  0.55  
(4) Zhirinovsky’s vote  The number of votes cast for Zhirinovsky divided by the number 
of registered voters  
87,720  0.04  0.02  0  0.04  0.52  
(5) Mironov’s vote  The number of votes cast for Mironov divided by the number of 
registered voters  
87,720  0.02  0.01  0  0.02  0.69  
(6) Prokhorov’s vote  The number of votes cast for Prokhorov divided by the number of 
registered voters  
87,720  0.04  0.03  0  0.03  0.35  
(7) Total number of 
polling stations  
Total number of polling stations in the region with at least 100 
registered voters  
78  1125  791  52  940  3390  
(8) University degree  Share of people with university degree, 2010  78  0.21  0.04  0.15  0.20  0.41  
(9) Distance from  
Moscow  
Geographical distance from Moscow, ‘000s km  78  1.81  1.84  0  1.16  6.43  
(10) Income  Income per capita, 2010  78  16.3  6.06  7.54  14.7  43.9  
(11) Fiscal transfers  Share of fiscal transfers in regional public expenditures, 2009  78  0.34  0.20  0.04  0.28  1.35  
(12) Media freedom  Index of regional media freedom for 2006-2010  78  2.91  0.96  1  3  5  
(13) Russians   Share of ethnic Russians in the regional populations  78  0.79  0.24  0.01  0.89  0.97  
(14) Oblast  Regions with oblast status  78  0.74  0.44  0  1  1  
(15) Reporting election-
day misconduct  
Number of reports of election-day misconduct in the region, 4 
March 2012  




Number of reports of pre-electoral manipulations in the region, 
September 2011–3 March 2012   
78  86.6  182  0  38.5  1185  
(17)𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒0  Last-digit fraud index based on observed frequencies of last-digit 
zeros and the likelihood ratio statistics  
78  1.71  2.27  0.00  0.92  12.4  
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(18)𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒1−9  Last-digit index based on relative frequencies of last digits 1 to 9 
and the likelihood ratio statistics  
78  8.66  4.35  2.29  7.94  23.1  
  
  
Table 2. Correlation matrix.  
 
        (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11)  (12)  (13)  (14)  (15)  (16)  (17)  
 
(1) Turnout  1.00                                  
(2) Putin’s vote  0.90  1.00                                
(3) Zyuganov’s vote  -0.06  -0.40  1.00                              
(4) Zhirinovsky’s vote  -0.06  -0.27  0.20  1.00                            
(5) Mironov’s vote  -0.17  -0.39  0.21  0.16  1.00                          
(6) Prokhorov’s vote  -0.26  -0.49  0.12  0.08  0.44  1.00                        
(7) Total number of  
0.05  0.04  -0.07  -0.18  -0.05  0.22  1.00                     
polling stations  
(8) University degree  -0.13  -0.21  -0.01  -0.07  0.16  0.54  0.32  1.00                    
(9) Distance from  
 -0.04  -0.02  -0.04  0.19  -0.10  -0.10  -0.30  -0.07  1.00                  
Moscow  
(10) Income  
 -0.12  -0.18  -0.11  -0.06  0.14  0.52  0.21  0.58  0.32  1.00                
(11) Fiscal transfers  
 0.12  0.14  0.05  0.02  -0.11  -0.28  -0.55  -0.21  0.34  -0.27  1.00              
(12) Media freedom  
 -0.35  -0.35  -0.03  0.03  0.18  0.28  0.35  0.18  -0.14  0.12  -0.36  1.00            
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(17 ) 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 0   0.29   0.35   - 0.11   - 0.22   0.14   - 0.24   - 0.45   - 0.29   0.11   - 0.08   1.00   
(18 ) 𝐷𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 1 − 9   0.02   0.01   0.03   0.01   - 0.06   0.05   - 0.05   - 0.10   0.07   0.09   0.05   
(13) Russians   
 -0.43  -0.49  0.15  0.33  0.19  0.24  0.24  0.06  -0.06  0.17  -0.59  0.39  1.00          
(14) Oblast  -0.40  -0.46  0.16  0.29  0.17  0.20  0.29  0.07  -0.06  0.16  -0.48  0.38  0.85  1.00        
(15) Reporting  
election-day  -0.11  -0.18  -0.03  -0.11  0.14  0.49  0.61  0.73  -0.27  0.41  -0.33  0.24  0.13  0.18  1.00     
misconduct  
(16) Reporting pre- 
-0.14  -0.21  0.00  -0.07  0.12  0.48  0.63  0.68  -0.25  0.45  -0.31  0.17  0.15  0.17  0.83  1.00   
electoral manipulations  
-0.17 -0.18 0.07 0.09 0.05 -0.05 0.05 -0.04 -0.01 -
0.04 -0.01 -0.15  
  
